Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness by Moretti, Luca
Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of 
reflective awareness 
 
Luca Moretti 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the view according to which a 
subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. It 
argues that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: 
seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting 
on her seemings and speculating about their causes. The paper also argues that 
because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic 
merits attributed to it by its advocates. If true, phenomenal conservatism constitutes a 
unified theory of epistemic justification capable of giving everyday epistemic 
practices a rationale, but it doesn’t afford us the means of an effective response to the 
sceptic. Furthermore, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t form the general basis for 
foundationalism.   
 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
The influential epistemological view called phenomenal conservatism is most commonly associated 
with Michael Huemer’s work––in particular Huemer (2001 and 2007)––but other epistemologists––
prominently James Pryor (2000 and 2004)––have proposed very similar views, though less 
general.1 According to phenomenal conservatism, roughly, a subject S’s seeming or appearance 
that P provides S with defeasible, non-inferential justification for believing P. Phenomenal 
conservatism looks quite plausible to me, but I need not subscribe to it here. The thesis I defend is 
conditional: if phenomenal conservatism is correct, it has a significant limitation. In particular, 
seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that S’s becoming reflectively aware of her 
seeming that P and wondering about its possible causes results in either just destroying S’s 
seeming-based justification for believing P or replacing this non-inferential justification with 
inferential justification. I call this phenomenon the problem of reflective awareness.2 I argue that 
because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism turns out not to possess all the epistemic merits 
that it has been claimed to possess. If true, phenomenal conservatism constitutes a unified 
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conception of non-inferential justification capable of providing everyday epistemic practices with 
a rationale. However, phenomenal conservatism cannot afford us the means of a forceful response 
to the sceptic, and it cannot constitute the general basis of foundationalism.  
 The remainder of this work is organized as follows: § 2 presents phenomenal conservatism 
and its alleged merits. § 3 articulates the problem of reflective awareness. § 4 draws consequences 
of this problem for phenomenal conservatism. § 5 concludes the paper.   
       
2. Phenomenal conservatism and its asserted merits 
The thesis that many of our beliefs are epistemically justified because they are based on our 
appearances or seemings––namely, ways things seem to us to be––looks quite plausible. For 
example, it looks plausible that I may have a reason3 for believing that an apple is on the table just 
because it seems visually so to me. Also, it looks plausible that I may have a reason for believing 
that I walked home yesterday just because I seem to remember walking home. It looks plausible that 
I have a reason for believing that 7+4=11 just because this seems a priori true to me. Phenomenal 
conservatism aims to account systematically for the justifying force of seemings. Its defining 
principle says that: 
(pc) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters S thereby has some 
degree of justification for believing that P.                   
 (Huemer 2007, p. 30) 
 
Huemer (2001) defends a stronger principle according to which for any proposition P, if it seems to 
S that P, S has prima facie justification for fully believing P. In later work, however, he rejects this 
stronger principle because exceedingly general. It is implausible that, for instance, a weak and 
wavering seeming that P could give S justification for fully believing P (cf. Huemer 2007, p. 30n1). 
Huemer would seem to presuppose, nevertheless, that if S had a clear and firm seeming that P, in 
the absence of defeaters S would have justification for fully believing P. Hence, an important, 
special case of (pc) must be this: 
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(pc*) If S has a clear and firm seeming that P, then, in the absence of defeaters S thereby 
has justification for fully believing P.  
 
One might contend, against (pc*), that it is dubious that whenever S has a clear and firm seeming 
that P, in the absence of defeaters S has justification for fully believing P. One might insist that S’s 
having justification for believing P requires S to be capable of entertaining the belief that P,4 and 
that S might be unable to do this in some cases. (Suppose S is affected by a kind of self-deception 
that inhibits beliefs of a certain sort.) Considering that humans can ordinarily entertain a belief that 
P when they have a seeming that P, a less objectionable variant of (pc*) is therefore this:  
  
(PC) Ordinarily, if S has a clear and firm seeming that P, then, in the absence of defeaters S 
thereby has justification for fully believing P.  
 
In the following, I will concentrate on (PC) rather than (pc), for I think (PC) expresses the view 
actually at stake in most discussion on phenomenal conservatism. Hereafter, whenever I speak of 
seemings (or appearances), I always mean clear and firm seemings. Furthermore, whenever I speak 
of believing a proposition, I always mean fully believing it.  
(PC) concerns propositional rather than doxastic justification (cf. McGrath 2013). Evidence 
E provides S with propositional justification for P just in case E gives S rational support for 
believing P whether or not S believes P because of E, or believes P at all. Furthermore, E provides 
S with doxastic justification for P just in case E gives S propositional justification for P and S bases 
her actual belief that P on E. Phenomenal conservatism has an internalist character because 
seeming-based justification depending on (PC) is determined only by mental states of S that are 
reflectively accessible to S––namely, S’s seeming that P and lack of defeating evidence.5  
Huemer and most phenomenal conservatives hold that S’s having a seeming is a matter of 
S’s having a certain sort of experience provided with propositional content but unanalysable in 
terms of belief. According to this popular view, the experiences that constitute seemings are 
characterized by a distinctive phenomenology that makes them represent their contents assertively. 
This phenomenology can be described as the feeling of ascertaining that a given proposition is true, 
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or the feeling of being presented with the occurrence of a state of affairs (cf. Huemer 2001, § 4. 
Also see Tolhurst 1998 and Chudnoff 2011). Apparent perceptions, apparent memories, intellectual 
intuitions and introspective states would all be species of this broad type of experience. Although 
there are other conceptions of seemings in the literature, there is wide agreement that the experience 
view is the one afflicted by fewer difficulties and is possibly the only one coherent with (PC).6 
Accordingly, I will take the expression “seeming that P” to refer specifically to an (assertive) 
experience as if P. 
(PC) entails that S’s seeming-based justification for P is defeasible. Different sorts of things 
can count as defeaters. S’s seeming-based justification for P can be defeated by, for instance, S’s 
evidence in favour of ~P,7 evidence that P’s truth is, in the relevant circumstances, not 
ascertainable by S’s pertinent faculty (e.g., her perception or her memory), evidence that S’s faculty 
is malfunctioning, and so on, where evidence in all these cases is another belief or seeming of S. In 
the next section, I will argue that the conjunction of S’s having a reflective belief that she has a 
seeming that P and S’s conceiving of explanations of the same seeming that entail ~P can also 
defeat S’s seeming-based justification for believing P. 
Note the “thereby” in (PC), which indicates that S’s justification for P is solely based on S’s 
seeming that P. For instance, S’s justification for P isn’t also based on S’s justification for 
entertaining her seeming that P. Indeed, the claim that a seeming can be epistemically justified for a 
subject appears incongruous (at least when justification is conceived of by internalist lights). 
Internalist epistemic justification is often thought of in terms of S’s not being epistemically 
blameworthy. Accordingly, S has epistemic justification for having attitude A towards P just in case 
S couldn’t be epistemically blamed for doing so. Another influential internalist conception is the 
epistemic permissibility one. Accordingly, S has epistemic justification for entertaining attitude A 
towards P just in case it is epistemically permissible for S to do so.8 Note that it would sound 
incongruous or meaningless to say that S is (not) epistemically blameworthy for having a given 
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seeming, or that it is (not) epistemically permissible for S to have a given seeming (cf. Pryor 2005 
and McGrath 2013). 
Saying that S’s justification for believing P is solely based on S’s seeming that P is also 
saying that this justification isn’t based on any belief of S’s or S’s justification for believing any 
other thing––for instance that S’s cognitive faculties are working properly, or that no relevant 
sceptical conjecture is true.9 Given that S’s seeming-based justification for believing P is not based 
on any belief, it qualifies as non-inferential justification (cf. Huemer 2015). 
An argument in support of (PC) by Huemer (2001, pp. 103-104) relies on Foley (1993)’s 
conception of epistemic rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational for S to do X if 
doing it would appear to S to be an effective way of satisfying the epistemic goal of believing the 
true and not believing the false. Suppose it seems to S that P is true, and S has no reason to doubt it. 
Then, believing that P would appear to S to be an effective means of pursuing the goal of believing 
the true and avoiding the false. Thus, on Foley’s conception, S’s believing that P is epistemically 
rational and so epistemically justified, in accordance with (PC). A limitation of this vindication of 
(PC) is its very reliance on Foley’s conception of epistemic rationality, which is controversial.10 
Another drawback is that it cannot vindicate crucial applications of (PC). A reason of (PC)’s 
intuitive appeal is that it seems to vindicate ordinary attributions of epistemic justification to 
beings––such as small children––who couldn’t have justification for ruling out sceptical conjectures 
or believing that their faculties are reliable, for they couldn’t grasp these complex thoughts. These 
unsophisticated creatures would also be incapable of grasping the complex notion of an epistemic 
goal. This defence (PC), therefore, will fail if S in (PC) refers to one of them.11 
Quite independently of the above argument,12 Huemer is convinced that if we adopt an 
internalist viewpoint in epistemology––one that sees a tight connection between what is 
epistemically justified and what looks reasonable to do for the subject––a principle like (PC) will 
emerge as self-evident (cf. 2001, pp. 104-105).13 A description of how this would happen has been 
given by McGrath: 
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Suppose it seems to you that P and you have no defeaters (i.e., no good evidence for ~P and 
no good evidence that this seeming is unreliable as to whether P). Which doxastic attitude 
would it be reasonable for you to have toward P? Disbelieve P, without good evidence for 
~P? Withhold judgment on P? It does seem to you that P, and you lack evidence for ~P and 
for the unreliability of the seeming with respect to P. The only reasonable attitude to take is 
belief.14                                                     (2013, p. 226) 
 
I admit I find these considerations quite persuasive. It’s also worth noting the following: we saw 
that the internalist often conceives of having epistemic justification in terms of not being 
epistemically blameworthy for doing something, or in terms of being epistemically permitted to do 
something. On both conceptions, (PC) appears intuitively true. For it looks plausible that if it seems 
to S that P and S has no defeaters, the only non-epistemically blameworthy attitude and 
epistemically permissible attitude for S to have towards P on the basis of her seeming is just belief.  
Whether or not (PC) proves self-evident to all those who lean towards internalism, there 
seem to be at least four general reasons why endorsing (PC) would be epistemologically 
advantageous according to (PC)’s advocates. To begin with, (PC) is claimed to provide a rationale 
for widespread epistemic practices. Our reasons for holding many ordinary beliefs, for instance, 
don’t seem to include thoughts about, say, the trustworthiness of our experiences or the reliability of 
our faculties (cf. Tucker 2013). Rather, we seem to take ourselves to have justification for 
entertaining many ordinary beliefs just because of how things appear to us to be. Furthermore––as 
already stressed––we often attribute reasons for entertaining beliefs to beings––such as small 
children––who couldn’t have the complex thought that their faculties are reliable (cf. Pryor 2000).  
(PC) is perceived to be philosophically appealing also because it appears to offer a unified 
account of the non-inferential justification of beliefs of very different types. (PC) or cognate 
principles have been invoked to explain the justification of, for example, perceptual (Pryor 2000, 
Huemer 2001 and Lycan 2013), a priori (Bealer 2000 and Chudnoff 2011), moral (Huemer 2005), 
mnemonic (Pollock and Cruz 1999) and religious (e.g., Tucker 2011) beliefs. 
A third motive of (PC)’s asserted philosophical significance is that it would afford us the 
means of a thoroughgoing response to the sceptic––in particular, the sceptic who assumes that the 
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subject S must have independent justification for ruling out any relevant sceptical alternative in 
order to possess (even only defeasible) justification for believing ordinary things. Epistemologists 
do agree that this assumption fosters some of the most virulent forms of scepticism (cf. Pryor 2000, 
Wright 2004 and Schiffer 2004). The phenomenal conservative can adduce (PC) and argue that S 
doesn’t actually need the independent justification that the sceptic assumes S must have. For 
instance, suppose S entertains a visual experience as if P––say, as if there is a hand. The sceptic 
might argue that S’s experience as if P can give S defeasible justification for believing P only if S 
has independent justification for ruling out the sceptical alternative according to which, say, S is a 
disembodied soul with the mere hallucination of a hand caused by a malicious demon. The sceptic 
will insist that S cannot possess this independent justification. Suppose, however, that S’s having 
the visual experience as if P is interpreted as S’s having a visual seeming that P. If S has this 
seeming, and (PC) is correct, in the absence of defeaters S will normally have defeasible 
justification for believing P even if S has no independent justification for ruling out any sceptical 
alternative (cf. Huemer 2001 and Pryor 2000 and 2004).15 Mnemonic scepticism can be rejected in 
similar way. Whenever S seems to remember that P, if (PC) holds true, in the absence of defeaters S 
will normally have defeasible justification for believing that P even if S has no independent 
justification for ruling out, say, the Russellian conjecture that the world was created just an instant 
ago. Other forms of scepticism can be addressed along these lines.  
A fourth asserted reason of why (PC) is philosophically significant is that this principle 
would be capable of constituting the general basis of fallible foundationalism––a view that many 
epistemologists find natural and plausible in itself. The claim is, precisely, that (PC) explains how 
beliefs of very different types can be basically––namely, non-inferentially––justified. It is our 
seemings, according to this view, that put an end to the regress of justified beliefs when we search 
for a basis for the justification of all our beliefs (cf. Huemer 2001, p. 102).16 
Needless to say, (PC) has been targeted by various objections. Some argue that (PC) is 
problematic because it makes the justification of controversial philosophical theses excessively easy 
 8 
to attain and enable people to justify crazy beliefs (e.g., Tooley 2013). Other epistemologists 
contend that principles like (PC) are dubious because they are in various ways incompatible with 
Bayesian reasoning (e.g., White 2006 and Wright 2007) or because they produce easy justification–
–namely, justification for ruling out sceptical alternatives in an implausibly easy way (cf. Wright 
2007). (PC) has also been argued to be false because seemings cognitively penetrated (i.e., partly 
caused) by irrational or unjustified mental states would be unable to justify beliefs (e.g., Siegel 
2012, Brogaard 2013 and McGrath 2013). Finally, some insist that (PC) is false because seemings 
would be able to justify beliefs only if there is higher order justification for believing that they are 
reliable (e.g., Bergmann 2013). Huemer and advocates of (PC) or cognate principles have addressed 
these and other objections.17 (PC) is certainly affected by various difficulties but it is far from clear 
that it has been lethally struck by any of these arguments.  
 
3. The problem of reflective awareness18 
To forestall possible confusion, let me distinguish between “S’s having (or entertaining) a seeming 
that P” and “S’s being reflectively aware of a seeming that P”. These two expressions don’t refer to 
the same mental states. The first expression refers to a mental state of S––her seeming that P––
which can exist in S’s mind even if S doesn’t reflect on her own mental states. The second 
expression refers to a more complex state of S, one that encompasses at least three items. That is to 
say: (1) S’s seeming that P, (2) S’s reflective acquaintance with her seeming that P,19 and (3) S’s 
reflective belief that she has the seeming that P (i.e., S’s belief that she has the seeming that P based 
on her acquaintance with her seeming that P).20 
 Suppose (PC) is true to the effect that S actually has defeasible, non-inferential justification 
for believing P on the basis of her seeming that P. The problem of reflective awareness can be 
described as follows: as S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that P and realizes that its 
existence can potentially be explained by hypotheses entailing ~P, S’s seeming-based justification 
for believing P will be either just destroyed or replaced with inferential justification. As it will be 
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clarified in the next section, this is a problem for phenomenal conservatism not because it shows 
that (PC) is false or dubious but, rather, because it diminishes (PC)’s philosophical significance.  
Here is a more detailed description of the problem of reflective awareness. Suppose that at 
time t1 S has a seeming that P and no defeating evidence. To make the description more tangible, 
take P to be a perceptual seeming––for instance, a visual seeming that there is a cat on the mat. 
(The same conclusions would follow, however, for seemings of different types with minimal 
changes in my description.) If (PC) is true, at t1 S will normally have justification for believing P. 
This looks quite reasonable (at least by internalist lights): since at t1 S has a clear and firm seeming 
that P and no defeating evidence, S could not be epistemically blamed if she believed P. 
Furthermore, it looks intuitive that at t1 S is epistemically permitted to believe P. 
Suppose, however, that at t2 S reflects on her mental states and becomes reflectively aware 
of her seeming that P for the first time. At t1 S didn’t entertain the belief that she had a seeming that 
P, whereas at t2 S does have this belief. At t1 S was thus incapable of wondering whether her 
seeming that P––of which she wasn’t reflectively aware––was veridical or deceptive; whereas at t2, 
S can easily ask herself this question. Let’s suppose that at t2 S does actually ask herself this 
question. S will be able to conceive of a number of (at least logically) possible alternative 
explanations of how her seeming that P has been produced. To begin with, S can hypothesize that 
her seeming that P is the effect of her actually perceiving that P. Let’s call the proposition saying 
that S’s seeming that P has been produced in a way that makes P true the veridical hypothesis. 
Furthermore, S can hypothesize that her seeming that P is nothing but an illusion or a hallucination 
produced by, say, a clever camouflage, LSD inadvertently consumed by herself, an incipient brain 
tumour, the Matrix, the Cartesian Evil Demon, and so on. Let’s call any proposition entailing that 
S’s seeming is deceptive to the effect that P is false a deception hypothesis. 
As a consequence of S’s reflective awareness and ensuing reasoning, at t2 S will realize that 
her seeming that P is a state that can possibly be produced by various sets of circumstances that 
make P false. This would happen if any of the deception hypotheses that S has conceived of were 
 10 
true. Suppose that at t2 S doesn’t have independent justification for ruling out some deception 
hypotheses she has conceived of. Consequently, at t2 S would become epistemically blameworthy if 
she still believed P. By the same token, it is intuitive that at t2 it will no longer be epistemically 
permissible for S to believe P.21 In conclusion, it appears true that (from an internalist viewpoint at 
least) whenever S is reflectively aware of her seeming that P and S conceives of some relevant 
deception hypotheses but doesn’t have independent justification for rejecting all these hypotheses, 
S’s seeming-based justification for believing P will be destroyed. 
The above conclusion doesn’t entail that if S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that 
P and conceives of some relevant deception hypothesis, S can no longer have justification for 
believing P. Quite the opposite, it is true that if S is reflectively aware of her seeming that P and 
conceive of some relevant deception hypothesis, S may still have justification for fully believing P. 
This happens, presumably, when S has independent justification for ruling out the deception 
hypotheses she has conceived of. However, in these cases S’s initial non-inferential justification for 
believing P, based on S’s seeming that P, will be supplanted by inferential justification for 
believing P. Furthermore, S’s seeming that P will only play an indirect role in sustaining S’s new 
inferential justification for P. Let me explain why all this happens by adducing some example. 
Imagine again that at t2 S comes to entertain, by reflection, the belief that she has a seeming 
that P and realizes that the existence of this seeming admits of possible explanations implying that 
~P. However, suppose now that at t2 S also possesses, say, statistical or inductive evidence for 
concluding that any of the deception hypotheses entailing ~P she has thought of is more likely to be 
false than the veridical hypothesis, which entails P. Or imagine that at t2 S does realize that the 
veridical hypothesis is simpler and more natural than any rival deception hypothesis, and suppose 
that this provides S with evidence to conclude that the veridical hypothesis is more likely to be true 
than its rivals. It is intuitive that in both cases, at t2 S would still have justification for believing P 
more than ~P and, possibly, for fully believing P. 
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As these examples show, once S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that P and 
realizes that its presence can be explained by a range of alternative hypotheses, S can still have 
justification for believing P––more than ~P or in full––only if S is able to conclude that the 
veridical hypothesis is the more probable or plausible explanation. Note that S would get to that 
conclusion through reasoning––that is to say, through an inference to the more probable or 
plausible explanation. Consequently, S’s justification for believing the veridical hypothesis––and 
thus P––would in this case be inferential. Inferences don’t connect seemings with beliefs, they 
connect premises with conclusions––namely, beliefs with other beliefs.22 In the case at stake, S’s 
inference would be one from S’s reflective belief that she has a seeming that P to S’s belief that the 
veridical hypothesis is probably or plausibly true. Therefore, in this case, it would be S’s reflective 
belief that she has a seeming that P––rather than S’s seeming that P itself––that would provide the 
basis of S’s justification for believing P. In this epistemic setting, S’s seeming that P would only 
play an indirect role: S’s acquaintance with this seeming would form the antecedent basis for the 
non-inferential justification of the premise of S’s reasoning––namely, S’s reflective belief that she 
has a seeming that P. 
To summarize, (PC) says that, normally, when S has a seeming that P, in the absence of 
defeaters S’s seeming supplies S with non-inferential justification for believing P. I have argued that 
seeming-based justification (if existing at all) is elusive in the sense that S can easily be bereaved of 
it. In particular, whenever S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that P and conceives of 
possible explanations of it incompatible with P, S’s justification for believing P will be just 
destroyed or replaced with inferential justification.  
 
4. Consequences of the problem of reflective awareness 
I now investigate the bearing of the problem of reflective awareness on the asserted merits of 
phenomenal conservatism summarized in § 2. To begin with, (PC) has been argued to supply a 
rationale for ordinary epistemic practices. In particular, in everyday life we seem to take ourselves 
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to be justified in holding many beliefs just because of how things appear to us to be. (PC) has 
been claimed to substantiate this attitude. I don’t think the arguments canvassed in § 3 can 
jeopardize this claim. The defeasible justification licensed by (PC)––supposing (PC) is true––is one 
that would be destroyed if we became reflectively aware of our seemings and speculated about their 
possible causes. However, it is a matter of fact that we seldom engage in the practices that would 
destroy our seeming-based justification in everyday life, as we customarily don’t reflect on our 
seemings and don’t speculate about their cause. As mentioned in § 2, the ordinary epistemic 
practices that (PC) apparently grounds include crediting small children with justification for 
believing various things. It is unclear how the arguments articulated in § 3 could jeopardize this 
thesis. Small children cannot reflect on their seemings and speculate about their causes. 
Consequently, the problem of reflective awareness doesn’t affect them.23   
Someone might suggest, however, that we (adults) should regularly reflect on our seemings 
and speculate about their causes on pain of being epistemically irresponsible (and so blameworthy). 
The thought might be this: since we could easily reflect on our appearances and wonder about their 
causes, which might bring in further relevant evidence, we are rationally required to do so. But this 
argument would be wrong-headed because enforcing systematically a requirement of this type 
would come at intolerable cognitive costs. We are all incessantly swamped with several concurrent 
seemings. Consequently, if we were required to become reflectively aware of each of them and 
speculate about their causes, this would encumber if not just paralyze our ordinary cognitive 
activities. 
A second reason why (PC) is claimed to be philosophically valuable is that this principle 
gives us a unified account of non-inferential justification. That we can destroy our seeming-based 
justification by reflecting on our seemings and speculating about their causes doesn’t imply that 
seeming-based justification is not unified. Therefore, this asserted merit of (PC) is not threatened by 
the problem of reflective awareness. If true, (PC) would give us a unified account of various types 
of non-inferential justification crucial to our ordinary beliefs. 
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A third proclaimed virtue of (PC) is that it affords us the means of a forceful response to 
the sceptic. Since (PC) deals in epistemic justification, this should be intended in the sense that (PC) 
affords us the means of a forceful response to the sceptic who questions that we have epistemic 
justification. A response of this type would be forceful only if––I submit––it enabled a committed 
thinker S who engaged with sceptical arguments that questioned her possession of epistemic 
justification to reject or seriously challenge those arguments. (An example of such a committed 
thinker might be Descartes in his Meditations.) It appears to me, however, that (PC) doesn’t allow 
for this kind of response to the sceptic.   
It is easy to see why this is so. Suppose S has an experience as if P and does engage with a 
sceptical argument that questions the claim that S has defeasible justification for believing P 
because of her experience. The sceptical argument says––precisely––that since S’s experience as if 
P can possibly be caused by a sceptical scenario SH entailing ~P, S could have defeasible 
justification for believing P only if she had independent justification for ruling out SH. The 
argument’s conclusion says that since S doesn’t have this independent justification, S doesn’t 
possess justification for believing P. Note that this sceptical argument is just an argument of the 
type that (PC) is claimed to enable us to defuse (see § 2 above). The crucial question is––therefore–
–whether S can actually respond successfully to this argument by adducing (PC) and contending 
that, insofar as her experience as if P consists of a seeming that P, S has defeasible justification for 
believing P even though S doesn’t have justification for ruling out SH. Unfortunately for the 
phenomenal conservative, the answer is negative. Consider in fact that S can actually engage with 
the sceptical argument under consideration only if she grasps the way in which SH puts her 
justification for P at risk. S can do this only if S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that P 
and acknowledges that its existence can possibly be explained by the deception hypothesis SH. We 
saw in the former section that when both these conditions are satisfied, even if (PC) holds true, S 
can have defeasible justification for believing P only if S has independent justification for ruling out 
SH. Thus, if S claimed that in these very circumstances she possesses defeasible justification for 
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believing P even though she doesn’t have justification for ruling out SH, S would simply assert 
the false. 
An example might be helpful at this juncture. Suppose that S takes herself to have 
justification for believing that (P) she had granola for breakfast, for she seems to remember that P. 
However, imagine that a sceptic comes forward and presents S with an argument that adduces the 
Russellian conjecture (RC) that the world was created just a few seconds ago together with S’s 
apparent memory. The sceptic’s argument says––precisely––that since S’s apparent memory that P 
can be explained by RC, which entails ~P, S can have defeasible justification for believing P only if 
she has independent justification for ruling out RC. The argument concludes that since S doesn’t 
have this independent justification, S doesn’t possess justification for believing P. Suppose that S 
engages with this argument. S will thereby become reflectively aware of her mnemonic seeming 
that P and will acknowledge that its existence can possibly be explained by the deception 
hypothesis RC. As we have seen, it is reasonable to maintain that even if (PC) holds true, in these 
circumstances S can have defeasible justification for believing P only if S has independent 
justification for ruling out RC. Suppose that, nevertheless, S responded to the sceptic that, given that 
her apparent memory that P is a mnemonic seeming, in these very circumstances S does have 
defeasible justification for believing P even though she doesn’t have independent justification for 
ruling out RC. This response would be flawed and thus unsuccessful. 
The lesson taught by this example generalizes to all cases of seeming-based justification 
apparently licenced by (PC). (PC) doesn’t afford us the means of a forceful response to the sceptic 
because our very engaging with the sceptic’s arguments would make our recourse to (PC), as a 
means to respond to those arguments, immaterial and thus ineffective. 
A fourth asserted virtue of (PC) says that this principle constitutes the general basis for 
fallible foundationalism, as (PC) allows for a straightforward account of our having basic beliefs of 
any type. Suppose a subject S has undefeated justification for believing a proposition P because––in 
accordance with (PC)––she has a seeming that P in ordinary conditions. If this seeming actually 
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caused a belief that P in S’s mind, this belief would be for S non-inferentially justified by that 
seeming. Advocates of phenomenal conservatism contend that the basic beliefs of our doxastic 
systems are generally seeming-based beliefs (cf. Huemer 2001, § 5).  
My view is that (PC), if true at all, could actually validate a form of foundationalism that 
explains the non-inferential justification of doxastic systems proper to subjects who are incapable of 
reflecting on their seemings and speculating about their possible causes, or proper to intellectually 
more sophisticated subjects who, nevertheless, don’t have reflective habits. This means––in other 
words––that (PC) could vindicate a form of foundationalism that accounts for the basic beliefs of 
small children and those proper to many ordinary people in everyday life.  
It is quite dubious, however, that (PC) could on its own validate a form of foundationalism 
that explains the non-inferential justification of doxastic systems proper to reflective subjects––that 
is to say, individuals who reflect systematically on some of their seemings and speculate about their 
causes (to obviate cognitive errors or for other reasons).24 Consider first that whenever S is 
reflectively aware of a seeming that P and speculates about its causes, S’s non-inferential 
justification for believing P will be destroyed or supplanted with inferential justification. Thus, even 
if S’s seeming that P caused a belief that P in S’s mind, in this case S’s belief that P would not be 
justified by that seeming for S. Furthermore, as suggested in § 3, when S is reflectively aware of a 
seeming that P, S’s reflective belief that she has a seeming that P will be based on S’s reflective 
acquaintance with that seeming. Thus, if foundationalism is true, when S is conceived of as a 
reflective creature, many of S’s non-inferentially justified beliefs should presumably be accounted 
for by a version of acquaintance theory. 
Before concluding let me address a possible response to my last criticism. To defend the 
claim that (PC) vindicates foundationalism in general, one might insist that S’s non-inferential 
justification for entertaining reflective beliefs about her own seemings is in fact licenced by (PC). 
One might claim––more exactly––that when S reflects on her seeming that P, rather than being 
reflectively acquainted with it, S comes to entertain a reflective or higher order seeming that she has 
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a seeming that P, and that this higher-order seeming provides S with non-inferential justification 
for reflectively believing that she has a seeming that P, in accordance with (PC).25 This ingenious 
reply wouldn’t prove very convincing, though. For the explanation of S’s non-inferential 
justification for entertaining a reflective belief that she has a seeming that P that appeals to S’s 
reflective acquaintance with her seeming that P admittedly looks simpler, less ad hoc and thus more 
plausible than the explanation that appeals to a higher-order seeming of S.26 
 
5. Conclusions 
I have focused on phenomenal conservatism––the view that our seemings provide us with 
defeasible, non-inferential justification for believing their contents. I have argued that seeming-
based justification, if existing at all, proves elusive in an important sense: it will be destroyed or 
supplanted with inferential justification whenever the subject reflects on her seemings and 
speculates about their causes. I have shown that because of this feature of seeming-based 
justification, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits that it is usually 
claimed to have. If true, phenomenal conservatism constitutes a unified theory of non-inferential 
justification that vindicates ordinary epistemic practices. However, phenomenal conservatism 
doesn’t enable us to respond effectively to pernicious forms of scepticism, and it doesn’t constitute 
the general basis for foundationalism.   
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Notes 
1._A list of advocates of phenomenal conservatism and cognate views is in the next section. 
2._I use the term “elusive” in a sense similar to one used Lewis (1996) to describe that which he 
thought was an important feature of knowledge. This similarity doesn’t commit me to endorsing 
Lewis’ views.     
3._I follow many in taking expressions like “epistemic reason” and “epistemic justification”, as 
well as “epistemic rational” and “epistemically justifiable”, to be very close in meaning and thus 
safe-changeable in many contexts of discussion. 
4._This claim is controversial. See for instance Smithies (2012).    
5._Phenomenal conservatism thus arguably satisfies internalism as both mentalism and 
accessibilism. As Huemer clarifies: “The main justification-conferring condition in this theory is the 
condition of its seeming to one that P. This condition is internal in the sense that it is a mental state 
of one’s own [and] it is, plausibly, a condition that the subject can become aware of, and 
introspectively aware at that… The no-defeater condition alluded to in the statement of Phenomenal 
Conservatism [i.e., (PC)] is perhaps harder to classify. But if defeaters themselves are characterized 
in terms of how things appear to the subject, or the subject's beliefs, or something generally along 
those lines, then the no-defeater condition will be similarly internal.” (2006, pp. 148-149).    
6._The belief view identifies seemings with spontaneous non-inferential beliefs. This view looks 
false because S could have a seeming that P without believing P (e.g., if S is aware of having an 
optical illusion that P.) The disposition view identifies a seeming that P with a disposition to 
believe P. This view doesn’t harmonize with (PC) because it is implausible that S’s mere 
disposition to believe that P could give S justification for believing P. This view is also implausible 
because S could be so convinced that her seeming that P is illusory that she may lack the disposition 
to believe P. On the other hand, S could be disposed to believe a proposition that doesn’t seem true 
to her (e.g., because of her wishful thinking). Also, it is intuitive that S’s seeming that P can explain 
S’s disposition to believe P. If seemings were dispositions to believe, this couldn’t be the case. 
According to the evidence-taking view, S’s having a seeming that P is the same as S’s believing or 
being disposed to believe that a mental state M of S is evidence for P. This view is implausible 
because S could believe or tend to believe that M is evidence for P (e.g., because of her wishful 
thinking) when P doesn’t seem to be true to S. Also, this view doesn’t cohere with (PC), for it is 
dubious that S’s mere believing or being inclined to believe that she has evidence for P could give S 
justification for believing P. See Tucker (2013) for further discussion.  
7._Where “~” is logical negation. 
8._I’m not endorsing any of these views as the correct characterization(s) of epistemic 
justification––I’m just using them as popular examples. For a survey of conceptions of epistemic 
justification and their problems see Silva (forthcoming).   
9._I would say that Huemer doesn’t even require S’s attention to be concentrated on a seeming that 
P in order for S to have propositional justification for believing P from that seeming. 
10._Locus classicus is Kelly (2003). 
11._A very similar concern is raised in Hasan (2011, pp. 133-134). 
12._Huemer (2001 and especially 2007) also delivers a self-defeat argument to the effect that the 
belief that (pc) is false cannot be doxastically justified. The argument is roughly as follows: (i) if S 
believed that P (where P stands for virtually any proposition including the one that (pc) is false), S 
would do so on the basis of S’s seeming that P, or on the basis of S’s seeming that Q, where P has 
been inferred by S from Q. But (ii) S’s belief is doxastically justified only if its basis is a source of 
propositional justification. Therefore, (iii) if (pc) were false, S would have no justified belief that P 
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for almost any P. Thus (iv) S would not even have the justified belief that (pc) is false. I set this 
argument aside because it is irrelevant to the concern of this paper and it is extremely controversial 
even among advocates of phenomenal conservatism. See Moretti (2015b) for a survey of objections. 
13._Huemer (2006) also argues that a principle like (PC) fleshes out the internalist intuition better 
than any other view.  
14._According to Tucker (2013), McGrath’s considerations don’t vindicate (PC) because 
“reasonable” in the quotation can be read by the internalist as just “rationally committable” rather 
than “justifiable”. In substance––according to Tucker––everything McGrath says is compatible with 
the thesis that if S has a clear and firm seeming that P, in the absence of defeaters S is (only) 
rationally committed to believing P. This wouldn’t vindicate (PC) because S can be rationally 
committed to believing P even if S has no epistemic justification for believing P. Rational 
commitment is a sort of lack of incoherence between S’s propositional attitudes that doesn’t require 
the attitudes to be justified. It is my opinion, however, that the discussion in McGrath (2013, § 2) 
answers Tucker’s concern. 
15._A concern might be that (PC) is actually ineffective against scepticism because (PC) is 
compatible with the requirement (R) that S’s having independent justification for ruling out any 
sceptical alternative is necessary (though not basing) for S’s having seeming-based justification for 
P. Pryor (2000, p. 545n33) suggests, however, that principles like (PC) undercut the most natural 
line of reasoning that the sceptic can adopt to support (R). This line of reasoning says that S needs 
independent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative because S’s seeming-based 
justification for P also needs to be based on this independent justification. 
16._There are other––perhaps minor––asserted merits of (PC), which I set aside here. For instance, 
(PC) has been claimed to provide solutions to the problem of expert recognition (cf. Brogaard 2013) 
and the speckled hen problem (cf. Tucker 2010).   
17._Here is an incomplete list of papers that respond to these objections. Crazy beliefs objection: 
Huemer (2015). Bayesian objection: Silins (2007), Kung (2010) and Moretti (2015a). Easy 
knowledge objection: Pryor (2004). Cognitive penetration objection: Tucker (2010) and Huemer 
(2013). Higher order justification objection: Rogers and Matheson (2011) and Moretti and Piazza 
(2015). For more comprehensive surveys of objections to (PC) and responses see Tucker (2013), 
Huemer (2015) and Moretti (2015b). 
18._I have discussed a local version of the problem of reflective awareness (applied to perceptual 
appearances only and interpreting inferential justification as high probability) in Moretti (2015a, § 
6).    
19._Where “acquaintance” should be intended as a form direct awareness in Fumerton (1995)’s 
sense. 
20._There is a third expression that one might want to distinguish from the above two expressions, 
that is to say: “S’s directing her attention to a seeming that P”. Arguably, S may have more than one 
seeming at the same time (for instance, S might simultaneously entertain the visual seeming that 
there is a book on the desk and the acoustic seeming that a radio is on). This third expression refers 
to S’s act of selecting just one of her concurrent seemings. This act of S doesn’t seem to require S to 
become reflectively aware of––in the sense clarified above––the selected seeming.  
21._As suggested by a reviewer of this Journal, a supporter of (PC) might try to respond by 
insisting that since S doesn’t have any seeming (or other evidence) that some deception hypothesis 
SH is true at t2, S’s immediate justification for P stands undefeated. However, this response 
wouldn’t work. For it is intuitive that once S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that P and 
realizes that there are possible explanations of its existence incompatible with P, S’s mere feeling to 
ascertain that P is true will cease to be by itself a good reason to believe P for S. And this will be so 
whether or not S has any seeming (or other evidence) that some SH is true.      
22._Let’s set aside conditional proofs.  
23._These considerations naturally suggest a view about epistemic justification that parallels Sosa’s 
celebrated thesis there are two different kinds of knowledge. According to Sosa, “One has animal 
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knowledge about one’s environment, one’s past, and one’s own experience if one’s judgments and 
beliefs about these are direct responses to their impact––e.g., through perception or memory––with 
little or no benefit of reflection or understanding… [Furthermore,] one has reflective knowledge if 
one’s judgment or belief manifests not only such direct response to the fact known but also 
understanding of its place in a wider whole that includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and how 
these come about.” (1991: 240. See also Sosa 2007 and 2009). Animal knowledge is mere reactive 
knowledge, whereas reflective knowledge is mainly unifying or integrating knowledge. If (PC) is 
true, we could distinguish between animal justification and reflective justification. S’s animal 
justification for believing P can be identified with S’s non-inferential justification for P based on 
S’s seeming that P. Justification of this type has essentially the function of certifying the rationality 
of S’s reactive beliefs––namely, directly caused by S’s appearances. S’s reflective justification for 
believing P, on the other hand, can be identified with S’s inferential justification for believing P 
based on S’s reflective belief that she has an appearance that P. Justification of this type stems from 
S’s ability to explain her appearance that P by adducing the truth of P in conjunction with the truth 
of many other propositions about S’s environment and cognitive faculties. Justification of this type 
has the function of certifying the rationality of S’s beliefs that aim at a unified and integrated view 
of the world.  
24._To have some examples, think of microscopists, birdwatchers, pilots, witnesses in courts of 
law, and epistemologists. 
25._Note that S’s being reflectively acquainted with a seeming that P and S’s having a higher-order 
seeming that she has a seeming that P are two different mental states, for only the former is factive 
but not the latter. 
26._One might additionally argue that this response is flawed because the problem of reflective 
awareness applies to S’s higher order seemings as well. For the existence S’s higher order seeming 
that S has a seeming that P can possibly be explained by a deception hypothesis––that is to say, an 
explanation that entails that S’s reflective belief that she has a seeming that P is false. I’m not sure, 
however, that this would be a good argument, as I’m not sure that deception hypotheses of this sort 
are really conceivable.   
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